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NOTE 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609: 






The Federal Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.) govern the introduction of evidence in 
United States federal courts for the ultimate purpose of ascertaining the truth and 
securing a just determination.1 Arguably, one of the most controversial rules is Rule 
609, which deals with the admissibility of criminal convictions for the purpose of 
impeachment.2 Its origins stem from English common law, in which criminals were 
deemed automatically incompetent to take the stand, forever marked as 
untrustworthy because of their prior criminal history.3 While defendants with 
criminal history are no longer automatically barred from taking the stand, Rule 609 
allows for the introduction of evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal history as a 
means of impeachment if the defendant takes the stand as a witness.4 As a result, 
defendants often choose not to take the stand in order to prevent their criminal 
history from being introduced to the jury by the prosecution.5 
This Note proposes that by discouraging defendants with a criminal history 
from taking the stand and individualizing themselves, Rule 609 disadvantages 
minority defendants. The rule puts these defendants in a position in which it is 
more likely jurors will rely on heuristic processes when making decisions about the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence, as well as the severity of the defendant’s 
punishment. Furthermore, if a defendant does choose to individualize themselves by 
taking the stand in order to limit implicit stereotyping, this choice places the 
defendant at a greater risk for conviction because jurors are more likely to convict a 
defendant with a prior criminal record. 
 
I. RULE 609 AND CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
 
Rule 609 is comprised of two parts that dictate the means by which past 
convictions can be admitted into evidence to impeach criminal defendants.6 The 
first part of the rule, 609(a)(2), addresses convictions for crimes involving 
 
1  FED. R. EVID. 102; See also Todd A. Berger, Politics, Psychology, and the Law: Why Modern Psychology 
Dictates an Overhaul of Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 203, 203 (2010).  
2  FED. R. EVID. 609; Berger, supra note 1, at 203.  
3  See Robert G. Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 334, 335 (1979).  
4  FED. R. EVID. 609.  
5  Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant's Testimony: Prior Conviction Impeachment and 
the Fight Against Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 836–37 (2016). 
6  FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
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dishonesty or false statements, which must be admitted.7 This part of the rule does 
not distinguish between felonies or misdemeanors.8 The second part of Rule 609, 
which is arguably more concerning, addresses the admissibility of convictions of 
crimes that do not involve dishonesty but were “punishable by death or by 
imprisonment for more than one year.”9 Evidence of these convictions must be 
admitted “if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to 
[the] defendant.”10 Unfortunately, the text of Rule 609 offers no guidance as to how 
courts should conduct this balancing test. 
The two key cases underlying Rule 609 are Luck v. United States11 and 
Gordon v. United States.12 These opinions emphasize the importance of considering 
whether Rule 609 might “deter defendant testimony and thus might deprive the fact 
finder of valuable information.”13 In Luck, a pre-F.R.E. decision, the D.C. Circuit 
interpreted a provision of the D.C. Code that permitted the impeachment of a 
defendant on the basis of prior criminal convictions.14 The court determined that 
whether a defendant could be impeached by a prior conviction should be determined 
by “sound judicial discretion,” and that the chilling effect on defendant testimony 
should be considered.15 In addition, the court emphasized that there will be “cases 
where the trial judge might think that the cause of truth would be helped more by” 
allowing the defendant to take the stand and tell their story without fear that they 
will be prejudiced by evidence of a prior conviction.16 The D.C. Circuit explored this 
issue again two years later in Gordon, finding that a defendant with a prior 
conviction “may ask the court to consider whether it is more important for the jury 
to hear his story than to know about prior convictions in relation to his 
credibility.”17 Ultimately, the court determined that there may be some instances in 
which it is more important to avoid the chilling of defendant testimony, despite the 
probative value of introducing such evidence: 
Even though a judge might find that the prior convictions are relevant 
to credibility and the risk of prejudice to the defendant does not 
warrant their exclusion, he may nevertheless conclude that it is more 
important that the jury have the benefit of the defendant’s version of 
the case than to have the defendant remain silent out of fear of 
impeachment.18 
 
7  FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
8  Id. 
9  FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
10  FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B). 
11  348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
12  383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
13  Roberts, supra note 5, at 856. 
14  Luck, 348 F.2d at 767–68. 
15  Id. at 768. 
16  Id.  
17  Gordon, 383 F.2d at 939. 
18  Id. at 940–41. 
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As such, both Luck and Gordon emphasize that the chilling effect on the defendant 
testimony can be enough to prohibit Rule 609 motions.19 Unfortunately, 
“[n]umerous courts have inverted the meaning of this factor by treating the 
‘importance of the defendant’s testimony’ as a reason to permit, rather than 
prohibit, the impeachment of that testimony.”20 District courts within the Second, 
Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have inverted the importance of the defendant’s 
testimony to mean that evidence of prior criminal acts should be admitted, and the 
Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit courts have done the same.21 
While the balancing test within the text of Rule 609(a)(2) was designed to 
prevent chilling defendant testimony, “[a]dmission of prior convictions for 
impeachment has become the default.”22 A 2006 study of exonerated individuals 
showed that in every instance of the defendant testifying despite having a criminal 
record, the trial court permitted the prosecution to impeach the defendant with 
evidence of their prior convictions.23 “This was true even when the defendant’s prior 
conviction was for [an identical] or . . . similar offense.”24 Essentially, once the 
defendant chooses to take the stand as a witness, he or she opens the door for the 
prosecutor to introduce evidence of his or her prior felony convictions, as well as any 
other convictions that involve dishonesty.25 
 
II. ALWAYS A CRIMINAL, ALWAYS A LIAR: THE HISTORICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
BASIS FOR RULE 609 
 
As is true for many other areas of the law, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
originate from English common law.26 The basis for Rule 609 developed during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England as a reaction to reforms in criminal 
procedure that allowed criminal defendants to produce witnesses on their own 
behalf.27 Before that time, only the prosecution had the power to produce 
witnesses.28 During this time of reformation, rules were developed to determine 
 
19  Roberts, supra note 5, at 874. 
20  Id. at 846 (quoting Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 
608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 199–200 (1989)).  
21  Id. at 847.  
22  Id. at 835, 856. 
23  John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 483–90 (2008). 
24  Id. at 491. 
25  FED. R. EVID. 609(a). While the rule generally allows for prior convictions as a means for impeachment, 
[e]vidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years 
has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the 
confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court 
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by 
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
 Berger, supra note 1, at 204 n.4. 
26  Spector, supra note 3, at 335. 
27  Robert Popper, History and Development of the Accused’s Right to Testify, 1962 WASH. U. L.Q. 454, 456. 
28  Id. at 454–55. 
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which people would be allowed to testify, and what types of witnesses were 
competent.29 
Eventually it was established that convicted felons were not competent to 
testify in court because their testimony was considered inherently untrustworthy.30 
In addition, defendants were also deemed incompetent to testify on their own behalf 
due to the heightened risk of perjury.31 While the automatic disqualification of 
criminal defendants was swept away with the procedural reforms of the nineteenth 
century, those same disqualifications formed the basis of Rule 609.32 
While multiple justifications have been advanced for admitting a defendant’s 
prior convictions, a common rationalization is that a criminal conviction reveals a 
character trait of dishonesty that makes the defendant’s testimony less reliable.33 
This assumption is not entirely outside what psychology tells us of human 
behavior.34 In fact, many psychologists agree that there is some continuity between 
a person’s past behaviors and future actions.35  
In 2000, Dolores Albarracin and Robert Wyer conducted a study to determine 
the extent that past behaviors influence future actions.36 In the study, “participants 
were led to believe that without being aware of it, they had expressed either support 
for or opposition to the institution of comprehensive exams.”37 Feedback about their 
past opinions—even though the opinions were manufactured—had a statistically 
significant impact on the participants’ present attitudes and ultimate conclusions.38 
These results suggest that past opinions or behaviors can influence a person’s 
future decisions.39  
That being said, the assumption that prior convictions automatically lead to 
inaccurate testimony fails to acknowledge “the role that different circumstances 
may play in determining how a person may act.”40 Social behaviors have a tendency 
to be largely variable in different situations.41 For example, psychologist Walter 
Mischel conducted a six-year study of children ages seven to thirteen and found that 
most actions are determined by situational factors rather than general or consistent 
 
29  Id. at 456.  
30  Spector, supra note 3, at 336. 
31  Popper, supra note 27, at 456. Perjury: “The act or an instance of a person's deliberately making material 
false or misleading statements while under oath; esp., the willful utterance of untruthful testimony under 
oath or affirmation, before a competent tribunal, on a point material to the adjudication.” Perjury, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
32  Spector, supra note 3, at 335–36. 
33  Berger, supra note 1, at 204–05. 
34  See id. at 207–08.  
35  Id. 
36  Dolores Albarracin & Robert Wyer, The Cognitive Impact of Past Behavior: Influences on Beliefs, Attitudes, 
and Future Behavioral Decisions, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (2000).  
37  Id.  
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Berger, supra note 1, at 207.  
41  See Walter Mischel, A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, 
Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality Structure, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 246, 246 (1995). 
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personality traits.42 Psychologists Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May came to a 
similar conclusion when observing children’s tendency to lie, finding that:  
Most children will deceive in certain situations and not in others. 
Lying, cheating, and stealing as measured by the test situations used 
in these studies are only very loosely related. Even cheating in the 
classroom is rather highly specific, for a child may cheat on an 
arithmetic test and not on a spelling test, etc. Whether a child will 
practice deceit in any given situation depends in part on his 
intelligence, age, home background, and the like and in part on the 
nature of the situation itself and his particular relation to it.43 
Studies  have also found that even in adults, past actions are likely to influence 
future behavior only when the circumstances surrounding both behaviors are 
largely the same.44 In 1998, Judith Ouellette and Wendy Wood conducted a series of 
studies to determine how much a person’s past behaviors dictate his or her future 
actions.45 They found that “frequency of past behavior will not always be a good 
indicator of habit,” especially when “contexts shift.”46 These studies raise serious 
doubts that an individual’s prior history is indicative of how honest he or she will be 
in the future.47 More often than not, situational factors will determine a person’s 
decision to be honest, rather than his or her history of honesty or dishonesty.48 As 
such, there is a limited psychological basis for Rule 609. 
 
III. JURIES AND COGNITIVE REASONING 
 
In order to understand how Rule 609 evidence affects juries’ perceptions of 
minority defendants, it is first important to understand how juries reason. 
Reasoning is a process that happens over time as a result of the human brain 
relying on two distinct cognitive systems.49 This “dual-process” account of human 
behavior best demonstrates the difficulties, both conscious and subconscious, juries 
face when tasked with making sound and rational judgments.50 
The Dual Process theory proposes that “decisions [are] made with either a 
fast, unconscious, contextual process called System 1 or a slow, analytical, 
 
42  Id. at 248–49. 
43  HUGH HARTSHORNE & MARK A. MAY, STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER 411–12 (1928).  
44  Judith A. Ouellette & Wendy Wood, Habit and Intention in Everyday Life: The Multiple Processes by Which 
Past Behavior Predicts Future Behavior, 124 PSYCHOL. BULL. 54, 70 (1998). 
45  Id. at 54. 
46  Id. at 69. 
47  Id. 
48  See Berger, supra note 1, at 318. 
49  Jennifer T. Kubota, Rachel Mojdehbakhsh, Candace Raio, Tobias Brosch, James S. Uleman & Elizabeth A. 
Phelps, Stressing the Person: Legal and Everyday Person Attributions Under Stress, 103 BIOLOGICAL 
PSYCHOL. 117, 118 (2014).  
50  See id. at 122. See also Geoff Norman, Dual Processing and Diagnostic Errors, Abstract, 14 ADVANCES 
HEALTH SCI. EDUC. 37, 37 (2009). 
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conscious, and conceptual process, called System 2.”51 These systems are sometimes 
also described as the implicit and the explicit, or the subconscious and the 
conscious.52 System 1 is typically “considered to be shared by all higher order 
organisms” and, as such, has had a significantly “longer evolutionary history.”53 It 
is “commonly associated with visual perception” because it is the system that allows 
for rapid, contextual, and categorical interpretations.54 However, System 1 involves 
more than just visual perceptions; it encapsulates all subsystems that involve 
associative learning processes.55 Within System 1, a heuristic analysis occurs, which 
is “a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions 
more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods.”56 While 
heuristic analysis can be highly efficient in many circumstances, it is often prone to 
error and the utilization of implicit stereotyping and bias.57 
System 2, on the other hand, is often considered the rational system, which is 
slow, deliberative, verbally mediated, and primarily conscious.58 It is commonly 
associated with the type of reasoning that leads to “effective problem-solving.”59 
Whereas System 1 is automatic, comparing past experiences to present situations, 
System 2 operates on abstract rules.60 Because System 2 is abstract, it can handle 
“hypothetical situations where no prior experience can inform judgments.”61 
Essentially, System 2 acts as a “correctional step,” to System 1 by “fighting off the 
primary impulsivity of [S]ystem 1” through analytic judgment and deliberative 
consideration.62 While evidence exists to suggest that System 2 can act simply as a 
post hoc justification for the determinations of System 1, it is in System 2 that the 
brain is most likely to correct heuristic errors, including implicit racial 
stereotyping.63  
Due to the fact that correcting heuristic errors takes mental effort, the 
System 2 correctional step is more likely to fail when “cognitive resources are 
drained and busy.”64 Jurors typically experience this type of cognitive drain when 
 
51  Norman, supra note 50. 
52  Id. 
53  Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational Processing: When People 
Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 819, 819 (1994).  
54  Norman, supra note 50, at 40. 
55  See Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra note 53, at 820.  
56  Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Making, 62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 451, 454 
(2011).  
57  Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra note 53, at 819–20. 
58  Id. at 819.  
59  Norman, supra note 50, at 40.  
60  Id.  
61  Id.  
62  Id. at 42 (quoting Patrick Croskerry, Critical Thinking and Decision-Making: Avoiding the Perils of Thin-
Slicing, 48 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 720, 720 (2006)). 
63  See Kubota et al., supra note 49.  
64  Id.  
2021] Federal Rule of Evidence 609 143 
 
they have to make decisions regarding the behavior of defendants.65 Because jurors 
are forced to make tough decisions and to process an immense amount of 
information, jurors often suffer from incomplete cognitive reasoning.66 When 
suffering from cognitive drain, jurors are less likely to contemplate all the evidence 
and possibilities for why a crime occurred.67 They are more likely to search for a 
“plausible scenario of ‘what happened’” and apply only the evidence that allows 
them to “attach certainty to this story.”68 As a result of their manufactured 
certainty, juries relying on System 1 heuristics are more likely to choose extreme 
verdicts in the event that their “plausible scenario” assigns guilt to the defendant.69 
Without the availability of System 2, juries are at risk of making inaccurate 
judgments for defendants, specifically minority defendants.70 
 
IV. ILLUSORY CORRELATIONS AND MINORITY DEFENDANTS IN THE COURTROOM 
 
The effects of a defendant’s race on legal judgments have been studied in 
many contexts, and both archival and experimental studies indicate that minority 
defendants “are more likely to be found guilty and, if convicted, [are given] longer 
sentences than White defendants.”71 Everyday perceptions are influenced by 
cognitive mechanisms that rely on racial stereotypes, resulting in flawed 
determinations about the culpability of defendants.72 This, in part, has to do with 
the fact that jury members rely heavily on heuristics to make determinations about 
culpability.73 Humans tend to “selectively notice and remember . . . events that fit 
with . . . preconceived conceptions and expectations.”74 This behavior is called 
“illusory correlation.”75 In essence, jurors are more likely to determine that a person 
behaved in a certain manner if that person fits within preconceived social notions of 
behavior.76 
The unfortunate reality for minority defendants is that they exist in a society 
that expects that they will break the law.77 Psychological evidence dating back to 
 
65  Id.  
66  See Deanna Kuhn, Michael Weinstock, & Robin Flaton, How Well Do Jurors Reason? Competence 
Dimensions of Individual Variation in a Juror Reasoning Task, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 289, 295 (1994).  
67  Id.  
68  See id. 
69  See id. 
70  See Christopher S. Jones & Martin F. Kaplan, The Effects of Racially Stereotypical Crimes on Juror 
Decision-Making and Information-Processing Strategies, 25 BASIC & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (2003). 
71  Id. at 1. 
72  See Galen V. Bodenhausen, The Role of Stereotypes in Decision-Making Processes, 25 MED. DECISION 
MAKING 112, 113, 116 (2005).  
73  Jones & Kaplan, supra note 70, at 1. 
74  Id. at 113. 
75  Id.  
76  Jones & Kaplan, supra note 70, at 2. 
77  See Bodenhausen, supra note 72, at 115.  
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the 1970s confirms that race is stereotypically associated with certain crimes.78 
African American defendants have some of the worst associated crimes. For 
example, they are perceived as “more likely than their White counterparts to 
engage in soliciting, assault-mugging, grand-theft auto, and assault on a police 
officer.”79 These racial stereotypes, combined with “illusory correlation” behavior, 
plague jurors’ analysis, making it extremely difficult for juries to come to a just 
result for a minority defendant. 
Even jurors who do not consider themselves to be racist or bigoted have 
implicit, stereotypic misconceptions about minorities. This is because “illusory 
correlation” behaviors manifest in the subconscious.80 Even when racial or ethnic 
stereotypes are subconsciously triggered, these stereotypes systematically distort 
the way evidence is processed, causing jurors to place an emphasis on information 
that makes defendants fit within their stereotypic preconceptions.81  
In a recent experiment, subjects were given information regarding a prisoner 
in order to determine whether that prisoner should be granted parole.82 While the 
information about the prisoner’s crime remained the same, the prisoner’s ethnicity 
was manipulated across various trials.83 In the presence of a racial or minority 
stereotype, subjects were less likely to consider the prisoner’s situational 
explanations for the crime and more likely to rationalize that the prisoner was the 
“type of person to commit this crime.”84 Similarly, in another experiment, a trial 
simulation revealed a strong correlation between the defendant’s race, assumptions 
of culpability, and the administration of punishment.85 In the trial simulations, 
minority defendants were more likely to be convicted, and if they were convicted, 
they were much more likely to be given a harsher punishment than their convicted 
White counterparts.86 
These studies establish that minority defendants are already at significant 
risk for racial stereotypes influencing and distorting jurors’ determinations 
regarding the defendant’s culpability.87 To make matters worse, because Rule 609 
discourages defendants with a criminal history from taking the stand, minority 
defendants with a record are subject to even greater jury prejudice. This is due to 
the fact that many defendants with records choose to plead the Fifth Amendment 
and not take the stand, a decision that also has negative affects on jury perceptions 
of guilt and morality.88 Despite the fact that jurors are technically instructed that 
 
78  Jones & Kaplan, supra note 70, at 1. 
79  Id. 
80  Bodenhausen, supra note 72, at 113, 117. 
81  Id. at 115. 
82  Id. 
83  Bodenhausen, supra note 72, at 115. 
84  Id. at 116.  
85  Jones & Kaplan, supra note 70, at 9.  
86  See id. at 5, 9. 
87  See id. at 5, 9–10. 
88  See Justin Sevier, Omission Suspicion: Juries, Hearsay, and Attorneys’ Strategic Choices, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1, 19 (2012).  
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they “cannot draw negative inferences from a defendant’s invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment,” ample evidence suggests that juries do just that.89 In a study of mock 
jurors who read a trial transcript where the defendant invoked the Fifth 
Amendment, jurors tended to believe that the defendant’s motivation for invoking 
the Fifth was to hide the their guilt.90 In another study, this time in a mock 
criminal trial, the more the defendant appeared to be withholding information—
which is what the Fifth Amendment allows defendants to do—the more the jury 
believed the defendant to be guilty.91 
Minority defendants with a criminal history are at a distinct disadvantage. 
Because minorities live in a society that expects them to commit crime, “illusory 
correlations” cloud the reasoning of juries faced with a minority defendant charged 
with a race-congruent crime.92 The more the defendant fits within the perceived 
demographic of the type of person who would commit a crime, the more likely it is 
that jurors will determine that the defendant behaved accordingly, regardless of the 
quality of the evidence presented.93 At the same time, minority defendants who 
choose not to take the stand to avoid introduction of Rule 609 evidence face even 
more negative inferences against them because jurors assume that not testifying is 
an admission of guilt.94 In attempting to avoid Rule 609 evidence by not taking the 
stand, minority defendants essentially create another “illusory correlation” that 
proves to jurors, who primarily reason in System 1, that the defendant is guilty. 
 
V. HOW TO PUSH JURIES INTO SYSTEM 2 REASONING 
 
Although modern psychology makes it clear that someone who “is untruthful 
or willing to break the law in one context does not prove that he or she will be 
untruthful or break the law in another context,” appropriate measures should be 
taken to ensure that “illusory correlations” do not influence jurors’ decisions to 
assign culpability for minority defendants.95 One such measure that has been used 
to combat bias is the process of individuation, which is a method that “relies on 
preventing stereotypic inferences by obtaining specific information” about a 
person.96 Studies suggest that by providing jury members with individualizing 
information about a defendant, such as a defendant’s background, there is a lesser 
chance that stereotypes will dominate the cognitive process of determining the 
defendant’s culpability.97  
 
89  Id.  
90  Clyde Hendrick & David Shaffer, Effect of Pleading the Fifth Amendment on Perceptions of Guilt and 
Morality, 6 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 449, 451 (1975).  
91  Sevier, supra note 88, at 19.  
92  Jones & Kaplan, supra note 70, at 2. 
93  Id.  
94  Sevier, supra note 88, at 19. 
95  Berger, supra note 1, at 214.  
96  Roberts, supra note 5, at 836. 
97  Id.  
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Individuation effectively pulls the brain out of System 1 processing and into 
System 2, replacing heuristic analysis with analytic judgment and deliberative 
consideration.98 This makes it less likely that a juror’s brain will rely on implicit 
biases to come to a judgment regarding the defendant’s behavior. Furthermore, by 
individuating the defendant, jurors are more likely to attribute a defendant’s 
behavior to the circumstances surrounding his or her actions rather than inherent 
traits.99  
In a study predicting sex stereotypes, participants were asked to read a 
transcript of a telephone conversation in which an individual described his or her 
actions and experiences in three different life events.100 Each individual was given a 
gender-stereotypic name.101 To the surprise of the sociologists conducting the study, 
participants relied on the details of the individual’s behavior in evaluating a 
person’s traits rather than on gender stereotypes.102 Similarly, another study found 
that after a group of participants listened to an African American student share her 
experiences for twelve minutes, there was no evidence of stereotypic activation, 
even though the same study participants showed evidence of stereotypic activation 
within fifteen seconds of meeting the student.103 Studies like these emphasize the 
importance of offering minority defendants the opportunity to individuate 
themselves. 
Taking the stand and revealing background information about themselves 
may be the most important thing a minority defendant can do to prevent implicit 
biases.104 However, in many cases, individualization requires that a defendant take 
the stand.105 If they do, Rule 609 allows for prior criminal convictions to be entered 
as evidence.106 The incentive to take the stand to individualize oneself is often 
outweighed by the risk that a jury will learn about prior crimes that affirm implicit 
stereotypes.107 
 
VI. FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION ERROR AND MINORITY DEFENDANTS ON THE 
STAND 
 
As discussed above, individuation is an effective method for preventing racial 
biases and heuristic analysis from clouding the jury’s mind when making a 
 
98  Norman, supra note 50, at 42–43. 
99  Kubota et al., supra note 49, at 122. 
100  Anne Locksley, Eugene Borgida, & Nancy Brekke, Sex Stereotypes and Social Judgment, 39 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 821, 822 (1980).  
101  See id. at 822.   
102  Id. at 825.  
103  Ziva Kunda, Paul G. Davies, Barbara D. Adams, & Steven J. Spencer, The Dynamic Time Course of 
Stereotype Activation: Activation, Dissipation, and Resurrection, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 283, 
286 (2002). 
104  See Roberts, supra note 5, at 875. 
105  Berger, supra note 1, at 216. 
106  See FED. R. EVID. 609. 
107  Cf. Roberts, supra note 5, at 874.  
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determination regarding the culpability of the defendant.108 As such, it may seem 
surprising that any defendant would choose not to take the stand as a witness. 
However, the fear of introduction of Rule 609 evidence against a minority defendant 
is typically enough to keep minority defendants from testifying.109 
Minority defendants place themselves at risk for introducing yet another 
“illusory correlation” if evidence of a prior conviction is revealed to the jury.110 As 
described previously, humans selectively remember behaviors that affirm 
preconceived expectations.111 If the assumption is that American society perceives 
minorities to be criminals, as evidence certainly suggests, then the fact that a 
minority defendant has already been convicted of a previous crime will certainly be 
used as an “illusory correlation.”112 As such, evidence of a prior crime further 
affirms stereotypic biases that already affect minority defendants, and the evidence 
increases jury members’ confidence in relying on those biases.113 
In addition to creating “illusory correlations” against a defendant, evidence of 
a defendant’s prior conviction, as allowed by Rule 609, also introduces the threat of 
Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE).114 This cognitive error is the tendency to 
“overvalue dispositional explanations . . . and undervalue situational 
explanations.”115 FAE explains why we think of people in terms of inherent traits 
rather than in terms of situational behaviors.116 In his book The Tipping Point, 
Malcolm Gladwell provides the following example of FAE:  
If I asked you to describe the personality of your best friends, you could 
do so easily, and you wouldn’t say things like “My friend Howard is 
incredibly generous, but only when I ask him for things, not when his 
family asks him for things,” or “My friend Alice is wonderfully honest 
when it comes to her personal life, but at work she can be very 
slippery.” You would say, instead, that your friend Howard is generous 
and your friend Alice is honest. All of us, when it comes to personality, 
naturally think in terms of absolutes: that a person is a certain way 
or is not a certain way.117 
While attributing a person’s behavior to inherent traits may be a common method of 
reasoning, such analysis fails to recognize the importance of the circumstances 
surrounding a person’s behavior.118  
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For criminal defendants with prior criminal histories, FAE indicates that 
cognitively stressed jurors may conclude that the defendant committed a crime in 
the past, simply because they are the type of person who would commit a crime.119 
A determination that a defendant has an inherent trait to commit crimes will likely 
influence a jury to believe that the defendant committed the crime in question, 
regardless of the validity of any other evidence presented.120 Unfortunately, similar 
to how “illusory correlations” increase jurors’ use of implicit stereotyping and 
heuristics in decision-making, FAE increases the likelihood that a juror will base 
the defendant’s guilt in a present action on the way they have behaved in the 
past.”121 
While individuation limits the effects racial biases and heuristics have on 
jury members’ determinations of culpability, Rule 609 removes the opportunity for 
defendants who have committed crimes in the past to individuate themselves. 
Evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal history creates “illusory correlations” that 
further attack the innocence of the defendant and influence the jury to rely on 
heuristics and racial bias.122 In addition, FAE may lead a jury to believe that the 
defendant, because he or she committed a crime in the past, has an immutable trait 
of criminality. Such an attribution would invariably lead a jury to determine 
criminality despite the quality of other evidence presented.123 As such, Rule 609 
significantly disadvantages minority defendants with a criminal history. 
 
VII. RULE 609 SHOULD EITHER BE ELIMINATED OR AMENDED  
 
The purpose of Rule 609 is to ensure that juries are aware of the credibility of 
the defendant’s testimony.124 Modern psychology tells us that Rule 609 does not 
effectuate that purpose.125 More often than not, situational factors will determine a 
person’s decision to be honest, not his or her history of honesty or dishonesty.126 As 
indicated by numerous psychological studies, Rule 609 creates significant prejudice 
against minority defendants. Thus, Rule 609 should be removed from the Federal 
Rules of Evidence or amended to only include evidence of prior convictions of 
perjury. 
Looking to how states use prior convictions, evidence suggests that the 
Federal Rules of Evidence would remain effective even if Rule 609 were 
eliminated.127 Montana, for example, prohibits introducing evidence that the 
witness has been convicted of a crime for the purposes of attacking the witness’s 
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credibility.128 Hawaii only allows evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes if the crimes 
involve dishonesty and the defendant must raise their own credibility.129 Virginia 
prohibits the introduction of the name and nature of prior crimes, with the 
exception of perjury, when attacking a defendant’s credibility.130 These state rules 
suggest that eliminating Rule 609 would not have a devastating effect on federal 
criminal procedure, since many states function without it. 
Should the outright elimination of Rule 609 prove to be impossible,131 Rule 
609 should be limited to the crime of perjury.132 If the purpose of the rule is to 
ensure that jury members are aware of past dishonesty to determine the likelihood 
of dishonesty in the courtroom, then the only relevant crime is past dishonesty in a 
courtroom.133 As such, convictions of perjury should be the only convictions 




Rule 609 disadvantages minority defendants with criminal records by forcing 
them to make a decision with no favorable outcomes. Rule 609 serves to inform 
juries as to whether someone is likely to lie on the stand by introducing past 
criminal acts, but modern psychological evidence suggests that Rule 609 does not 
effectuate that purpose. In fact, Rule 609 ignores how context influences the way 
people behave and incorrectly presumes that honesty or dishonesty are inherent 
human traits. Through the introduction of Rule 609 evidence, minority defendants 
are subject to determinations by juries stuck in System 1 processing. This means 
juries are more likely to rely on subconscious processes when making decisions 
regarding the defendant’s guilt or innocence. In fact, System 1 practically 
guarantees that implicit stereotypes are employed.134 Furthermore, should a 
defendant attempt to draw juries into System 2 processing by individualizing 
themselves on the stand, evidence suggests that this places defendants with a 
criminal history at a greater risk for conviction.135 This is because jurors are more 
prone to convict defendants with prior criminal convictions due to “illusory 
correlations” as well as FAEs.136 To protect minority defendants, Rule 609 should be 
significantly amended or generally abolished. 
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